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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Minnesota Supreme Court recently held that a warrant is 
not required to perform a breath test of an individual arrested on 
suspicion of driving while intoxicated because such a search falls 
into the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant 
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requirement of the Fourth Amendment.1 In so concluding, the 
court also held that a statute criminalizing one’s refusal to take a 
breath test did not violate his or her due process under the 
Fourteenth Amendment because no fundamental right was 
violated.2 
This case note first discusses the relevant case law surrounding 
Fourth Amendment searches in general and the justification 
required to conduct a search under the Fourth Amendment.3 It 
next discusses the facts and procedural history of the Bernard case, 
the Minnesota Supreme Court’s findings and holdings, and the 
opinion of the dissenters.4 This note also examines how the 
Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding contradicts Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence by misinterpreting the search-incident-
to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement.5 This note argues 
that, based on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, a warrantless 
search of one’s breath following an arrest is not justified under the 
search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement.6 
Also addressed in this note is how the holding violates public policy 
considerations courts often consider in due process violation 
situations.7 Finally, this note will conclude that Bernard’s 
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was violated because 
Minnesota has effectively criminalized his right to refuse 
unconstitutional searches.8 
II. HISTORY OF THE RELEVANT CASE LAW 
A. Right to Be Free from Unreasonable Searches 
Both the United States Constitution and the Minnesota 
Constitution provide that the people shall be secure in their 
persons from unreasonable searches and seizures.9 Originally, the 
 
 1.  State v. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d 762, 772 (Minn. 2015). 
 2.  Id. at 773–74. 
 3.  See infra Part II. 
 4.  See infra Part III. 
 5.  See infra Part IV. 
 6.  See infra Part IV. 
 7.  See infra Part IV. 
 8.  See infra Part V. 
 9.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 10. In some circumstances, 
the Minnesota Constitution has been interpreted as providing greater protection 
than the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Acher v. Comm’r 
2
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Fourth Amendment was limited to protecting individuals from 
unreasonable searches by federal officials, but not from 
unreasonable searches by state officials.10 In Weeks v. United States, 
the Supreme Court interpreted the protection afforded by the 
Fourth Amendment as requiring evidence obtained as a result of 
an unreasonable search to be prohibited from use by the 
government against the accused at trial.11 This rule has come to be 
known as the “exclusionary rule.”12 The Fourth Amendment has 
since been incorporated to apply to state officials as well as federal 
officials through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.13 
 
Pub. Safety, 519 N.W.2d 183, 184–85 (Minn. 1994) (holding the use of temporary 
road blocks in order to conduct random investigatory stops on vehicles in the 
hope of finding drunk drivers was in violation of Minnesota Constitution Article I, 
Section 10 in contradiction to Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 
444 (1990), which held that such a practice was not in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment); see also State v. Carter, 596 N.W.2d 654, 657 (Minn. 1999) (noting 
that in situations where “the Supreme Court’s decisions [were] ‘radical’ or ‘sharp’ 
departures from precedent,” deviation from federal holdings may be appropriate). 
However, generally, Article 1, Section 10 of Minnesota’s Constitution and the 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution have been interpreted as 
providing the same protections. Id. at 658. In light of this general interpretation, 
this case note will treat the two provisions as providing the same amount of 
protection. 
 10.  See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). 
 11.  Id. (“We therefore reach the conclusion that the letters in question were 
taken from the house of the accused by an official of the United States . . . in 
direct violation of the constitutional rights of the defendant . . . . In holding them 
and permitting their use upon the trial, we think prejudicial error was 
committed.”). 
 12.  See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650 (1961) (deriving the Court’s 
rationale from Weeks as “the Weeks exclusionary rule”). 
 13.  Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27–28 (1949). While Wolf held that the 
Fourth Amendment was applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, it did not extend the exclusionary rule delineated in 
Weeks to apply to evidence obtained illegally from state officials. Id. It was not until 
Mapp that the exclusionary rule was extended to protect citizens from the use of 
evidence obtained illegally by state officials. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655. In Mapp, the 
Supreme Court stated:  
Were it otherwise, then just as . . . the assurance against unreasonable 
federal searches and seizures would be “a form of words”, valueless and 
undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human 
liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom from state invasions of 
privacy would be so epemeral [sic] and so neatly severed from its 
conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing 
3
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A search occurs within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment 
when the government intrudes into an area where a person has a 
“reasonable expectation of privacy.”14 What is considered 
reasonable is an objective test; it is not enough that an individual 
expects privacy. What matters is whether a reasonable person 
under the circumstances would expect privacy.15 “What a person 
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is 
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. . . . But what he 
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, 
may be constitutionally protected.”16 
Just because a search or seizure has occurred under the Fourth 
Amendment does not mean one’s constitutional rights have been 
violated. The Fourth Amendment does not protect against “all 
searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures.”17 As 
the Court stated in Weeks, protection against unreasonable searches 
and seizures 
took its origin in the determination of the framers of the 
Amendments to the Federal Constitution to provide for 
that instrument a Bill of Rights, securing to the American 
people . . . those safeguards which had grown up in 
England to protect the people from unreasonable 
 
evidence as not to merit this Court’s high regard as a freedom “implicit 
in the concept of ordered liberty.” 
Id. (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213 (1960)). 
 14.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); 
State v. Larsen, 650 N.W.2d 144, 148 (Minn. 2002). 
 15.  Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (“The [Fourth] 
Amendment does not protect the merely subjective expectation of privacy, but 
only those ‘expectation[s] that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.’” 
(quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (alteration in original))). 
 16.  Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (majority opinion) (citations omitted). The 
objective nature of this test has certainly resulted in some interesting holdings by 
the Supreme Court. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988) 
(finding no objective reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage bags left on the 
side of the curb in front of one’s home because “it is common knowledge that 
plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street are readily accessible to 
animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public”); 
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986) (finding no objective reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the contents of one’s backyard that was surrounded by “a 
six-foot outer fence and a ten-foot inner fence completely enclosing the yard” 
blocking view at ground level because the yard was visible by aircraft from a height 
of 1,000 feet in navigable airspace). 
 17.  Elkins, 364 U.S. at 222. 
4
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searches and seizures, such as were permitted under the 
general warrants issued under authority of the 
government, by which there had been invasions of the 
home and privacy of the citizens, and the seizure of their 
private papers in support of charges, real or imaginary, 
made against them.18 
A general warrant, as described in this context, “is one that 
does not specify the items to be searched for or the persons to be 
arrested.”19 A general warrant also does not require a showing of 
probable cause to be issued.20 It was in “[r]esistance to these 
practices . . . [that] the principle which was enacted into the 
fundamental law in the [Fourth] Amendment, that a man’s house 
was his castle, and not to be invaded by any general authority to 
search and seize his goods and papers” was established.21 Although 
the Fourth Amendment has generally been interpreted in terms of 
protecting privacy, perhaps its protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures is better described as protecting individual 
autonomy against unreasonable intrusion by governmental officials.22 
B. Justifying Governmental Intrusion 
The remainder of the Fourth Amendment provides that “no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized.”23 The Fourth Amendment 
protects against unreasonable searches and seizures through its 
warrant requirement.24 
 
 18.  Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914). 
 19.  68 AM. JUR. 2D Searches and Seizures § 212 (2015). 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Weeks, 232 U.S. at 390. 
 22.  See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“[T]he Fourth 
Amendment protects people, not places.”); Weeks, 232 U.S. at 391 (“It is not the 
breaking of his doors and the rummaging of his drawers that constitutes the 
essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal 
security, personal liberty, and private property, where that right has never been 
forfeited by his conviction of some public offense . . . .” (quoting Boyd v. United 
States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886))). 
 23.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 24.  Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 164 (1978) (“The bulwark of Fourth 
Amendment protection, of course, is the Warrant Clause, requiring that, absent 
certain exceptions, police obtain a warrant from a neutral and disinterested 
magistrate before embarking upon a search.”). 
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Any search under the Fourth Amendment must be supported 
by probable cause and a warrant25 or an exception to the warrant 
requirement.26 The Supreme Court has adopted a “totality-of-the-
circumstances approach” in determining whether probable cause 
exists.27 “The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with 
probabilities.”28 
In addition to probable cause, governmental officials need a 
warrant to justify a search of a person or their property.29 A neutral 
magistrate is to determine whether probable cause exists based on 
oath or affirmation by the official seeking the warrant.30 A 
warrantless search is per se unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment, subject to “specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions.”31 There are several recognized exceptions to the 
warrant requirement.32 Many of these exceptions derive out of 
 
 25.  It would, perhaps, be more accurate to say that any full search under the 
Fourth Amendment must be accompanied by probable cause. The Supreme Court 
has recognized searches that fall short of a full search. In the landmark Fourth 
Amendment case of Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court recognized a type of search 
that was something less than a full search, one that is “limited to that which is 
necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or 
others nearby” during an investigatory stop. 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968). Such searches 
need not be accompanied by probable cause, but only reasonable suspicion where 
“a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief 
that his safety or that of others was in danger.” Id. at 27. Because Bernard involves a 
full search, this case note will focus on the justifications for full searches. 
 26.  See, e.g., Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1558 (2013) (discussing the 
exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement); Arizona v. Gant, 
556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (discussing officer safety and the preservation of 
evidence as justifications for the search-incident-to-arrest exception); Katz, 389 
U.S. at 357.  
 27.  Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230–31 (1983).  
 28.  Id. (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)). 
 29.  See, e.g., McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1558; Gant, 556 U.S. at 338; Katz, 389 U.S. 
at 357. 
 30.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The oath or affirmation provision requires “that 
a warrant affidavit must set forth particular facts and circumstances underlying the 
existence of probable cause, so as to allow the magistrate to make an independent 
evaluation of the matter.” Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 165 (1978). The 
Fourth Amendment “takes the affiant’s good faith as its premise,” requiring that 
the underlying facts and circumstances be “‘truthful’ in the sense that the 
information put forth is believed or appropriately accepted by the affiant as true.” 
Id. at 164, 165.  
 31.  Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. 
 32.  See McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1558–59 (recognizing an exigent circumstances 
exception to protect imminent destruction of evidence, provide emergency 
6
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public policy concerns, such as “law enforcement’s need to provide 
emergency assistance to an occupant of a home . . . or enter a 
burning building to put out a fire and investigate its cause.”33 It is 
important to remember, however, that a warrantless search is 
presumed to be unreasonable; it can become reasonable only if the 
situation would justify it.34 
Courts also decide whether to “exempt a given type of search 
from the warrant requirement ‘by assessing, on the one hand, the 
degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on 
the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of 
legitimate governmental interests.’”35 The exception to the warrant 
requirement on which this case note will focus is the search-
incident-to-arrest exception.36 However, some discussion on the 
exigent circumstances exception is necessary to provide useful 
background information for a better understanding of the issues in 
Bernard, as the two exceptions overlap in some respects. 
In Missouri v. McNeely, the Supreme Court addressed “whether 
the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream establishes a 
per se exigency that suffices on its own to justify an exception to the 
warrant requirement for nonconsensual blood testing in drunk-
driving investigations.”37 The defendant was arrested on suspicion 
of driving while being impaired.38 After the arrest, the officer asked 
the defendant to submit to a breath test, and he refused.39 The 
officer informed the defendant that, under Missouri law, refusing 
to submit to a chemical test could result in license revocation for 
up to a year with the possibility of the refusal being used at a 
subsequent criminal proceeding.40 After the defendant refused, the 
officer transported him to a nearby hospital for a blood test.41 After 
 
assistance, or to allow police to maintain “hot pursuit” of a suspect); Gant, 566 U.S. 
at 338 (recognizing a search-incident-to-arrest exception). 
 33.  McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1559. 
 34.  Id. (“[A] warrantless search is potentially reasonable because ‘there is 
compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.’” (quoting 
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978))). 
 35.  Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014) (quoting Wyoming v. 
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)). 
 36.  See infra Part III.B. 
 37.  133 S. Ct. at 1558. 
 38.  Id. at 1556–57. 
 39.  Id. at 1557. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. 
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the defendant refused to take the blood test, the officer ordered 
the lab technician to take a blood sample anyway.42 The defendant 
moved to suppress the blood test and succeeded at trial.43 The trial 
court concluded the exigent circumstances exception to the 
warrant requirement did not apply to the natural dissipation of 
alcohol in the blood stream.44 
The case was appealed all the way to the United States 
Supreme Court, which held that “in drunk-driving investigations, 
the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not 
constitute an exigency in every case sufficient to justify conducting 
a blood test without a warrant,” refusing to acknowledge a “per se 
exigency” in all DWI cases.45 The Supreme Court acknowledged, 
however, that under certain circumstances, a warrantless search of 
one’s blood could be justified by an exigency, but the exigency 
“must be determined case by case based on the totality of the 
circumstances.”46 It is important to remember this holding when 
analyzing the majority’s opinion in Bernard. 
C. Search-Incident-to-Arrest Exception 
One exception to the warrant requirement arises when the 
search is incident to a lawful arrest.47 The search-incident-to-arrest 
exception to the warrant requirement “derives from interests in 
officer safety and evidence preservation that are typically 
implicated in arrest situations.”48 The search-incident-to-arrest 
exception serves two purposes. First, an arresting officer may search 
a person arrested “in order to remove any weapons” that person 
might have on them; [o]therwise, the officer’s safety might well be 
endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated.”49 Second, an arresting 
officer may search “the area ‘within his immediate control’—
construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he 
might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.”50 The 
 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. at 1568. 
 46.  Id. at 1563. 
 47.  Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009); United States v. Robinson, 414 
U.S. 218, 224 (1973). 
 48.  Gant, 566 U.S. at 338. 
 49.  Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). 
 50.  Id.  
8
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purpose of this is “to prevent [the evidence’s] concealment or 
destruction.”51 Limiting the search-incident-to-arrest exception to a 
specific, narrow interpretation “ensures that the scope of a search 
incident to arrest is commensurate with its purposes of protecting 
arresting officers and safeguarding any evidence of the offense of 
arrest that an arrestee might conceal or destroy.”52 The search-
incident-to-arrest exception is strictly limited to serve these two 
purposes.53 
One place that the Supreme Court considered essentially off-
limits from warrantless searches is a person’s home.54 This includes 
warrantless searches incident to arrest.55 Such protection is 
grounded in important privacy and policy considerations. 
D. Right to Due Process of Law 
Both the U.S. Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution 
provide that the government shall not “deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law.”56 Due process has 
both a procedural component and a substantive component.57 In 
 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Gant, 556 U.S. at 339. 
 53.  Id. (“If there is no possibility that an arrestee could reach into the area 
that law enforcement officers seek to search, both justifications for the search-
incident-to-arrest exception are absent and the rule does not apply.”). 
 54.  McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455–56 (1948) (noting that 
requiring a warrant be issued by a neutral magistrate prior to a search “was done 
not to shield criminals nor to make the home a safe haven for illegal activities” but 
“was done so that an objective mind might weigh the need to invade that privacy 
in order to enforce the law”). The Court in McDonald explained that “[t]he right 
of privacy [is] precious to entrust to the discretion of those whose job is the 
detection of crime and the arrest of criminals.” Id. The Court went on to point out 
that power is dangerous, and stressed the importance of placing a neutral 
magistrate between police and the sanctity of people’s homes, noting that the 
“police acting on their own cannot be trusted.” Id.; Weeks v. United States, 232 
U.S. 383, 390 (1914) (stating a man’s house is his castle and is “not to be invaded 
by any general authority to search and seize his goods and papers”). 
 55.  Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). 
 56.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
 57.  Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 764 (1997) (“The text of the 
Due Process Clause thus imposes nothing less than an obligation to give 
substantive content to the words ‘liberty’ and ‘due process of law.’”); Poe v. 
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541 (1961) (“Were due process merely a procedural 
safeguard it would fail to reach those situations where the deprivation of life, 
liberty or property was accomplished by legislation which by operating in the 
9
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addition to requiring the government to follow the procedures set 
forth in the Constitution, the Due Process Clause provides 
“heightened protection against government interference with 
certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.”58 The court 
determines whether an asserted right is worthy of heightened 
protection by asking whether the right is “deeply rooted in this 
Nation’s history and tradition . . . and implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if 
they were sacrificed.”59 The Supreme Court has recognized several 
fundamental rights worthy of heightened constitutional 
protection.60 The right to be free from unreasonable searches 
under the Fourth Amendment is considered a fundamental right 
worthy of heightened protection under the due process clause.61 
Whenever a statute significantly interferes with a fundamental 
right, the court applies a “strict scrutiny” test to determine whether 
or not such interference violates substantive due process.62 In order 
for a statute to survive strict scrutiny analysis, “the state must 
demonstrate that the statute serves a compelling state interest, and 
that the state’s objectives could not be achieved by any less 
restrictive measures.”63 This means that the statute must be 
“narrowly tailored” so that it “eliminates no more than the exact 
source of the ‘evil’ it seeks to remedy.”64 If there is no compelling 
 
future could, given even the fairest possible procedure in application to 
individuals, nevertheless destroy the enjoyment of all three.”). 
 58.  Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720. 
 59.  Id. at 720–21 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 
503–04 (1977); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937); Snyder v. 
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).  
 60.  See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (extending the 
fundamental right to privacy to include the fundamental right of a woman to 
decide whether to terminate her pregnancy); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 
(1967) (recognizing a fundamental right to marry); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (recognizing a fundamental right to marital privacy); Skinner 
v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (recognizing a 
fundamental right to have children); see also Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 
174 (1952) (finding it “offensive to human dignity” to stomach pump a defendant 
against his will to obtain morphine pills to use against him at trial).  
 61.  Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655–56 (1961) (noting that Wolf v. Colorado, 
338 U.S. 25 (1949) extended “the substantive protections of due process to all 
constitutionally unreasonable searches—state or federal”). 
 62.  16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 403 (2015). 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. 
10
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state interest, or if the statute is not narrowly tailored to achieve the 
compelling state interest, the statute fails strict scrutiny and violates 
substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.65 
If a statute does not interfere with a fundamental right, 
substantive due process requires only that the statute be analyzed 
under a “rational basis” standard.66 In order to pass the rational 
basis test, the court must determine “whether, in enacting 
legislation, the legislature is acting in pursuit of permissible state 
objectives and, if so, whether the means adopted are reasonably 
related to accomplishment of those objectives.”67 This is a 
deferential test, where courts do not act as policy makers; rather, it 
is their duty to make sure the methods chosen are not an 
unreasonable means of achieving a permissible result.68 
Fourteenth Amendment due process protection depends 
greatly on whether or not a fundamental right has been 
implicated.69 If the statute implicates a fundamental right, the 
statute is scrutinized more closely, protecting individuals from 
governmental overreach. If there is no fundamental right 
implicated, great deference is given to the state. This is why, as this 
case note will explore, it matters significantly whether a post-arrest 
warrantless search of one’s breath is an unreasonable search under 
the Fourth Amendment. If it is, then any statute criminalizing 
refusal to consent to such an unreasonable search would implicate 
a fundamental right. Such a statute could only be constitutional if it 
survives strict scrutiny.70 
 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 965 (2015); see also Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997) (noting that even though the court did not 
recognize physician-assisted suicide as a fundamental right, the state legislature 
still had the burden of demonstrating that banning physician-assisted suicide was 
“rationally related to legitimate government interests”). 
 67.  16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 965. 
 68.  Id.  
 69.  Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720. 
 70.  Id. at 721 (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment ‘forbids the government to 
infringe . . . “fundamental” liberty interests at all, no matter what process is 
provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state 
interest.’” (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993))). 
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III. THE BERNARD DECISION 
A. Facts and Procedural Posture 
Police received a report on August 5, 2012, that three 
intoxicated individuals were trying to get a boat out of the water at 
a boat launch in South Saint Paul.71 When the police arrived at the 
boat launch, a witness informed them that the men’s truck became 
stuck in the river while they were attempting to pull their boat out 
of the water.72 One of the men, William Robert Bernard, was in his 
underwear.73 As the officers approached the men, they could smell 
a strong odor of alcohol coming from the group.74 Bernard 
admitted to the officers that he had been drinking, but he denied 
driving the truck.75 While speaking with Bernard, the officers 
noticed the smell of alcohol on his breath; his bloodshot, watery 
eyes; and the keys to the truck in his hand.76 After refusing to 
perform a field sobriety test, the officers arrested Bernard on 
suspicion of driving while impaired.77 
At the police station, the officers read Bernard the Implied 
Consent Advisory78 and gave Bernard an opportunity to speak with 
an attorney.79 Bernard called his mother, told officers he did not 
need any more time, and refused to take a breath test.80 
The state charged Bernard with two counts of first-degree test 
refusal.81 Bernard filed a motion to dismiss the charges on the 
 
 71.  State v. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d 762, 764 (Minn. 2015). 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id.  
 76.  Id.  
 77.  Id.  
 78.  MINN. STAT. § 169A.51, subdiv. 2 (2014) (requiring a person arrested for 
driving while impaired to be advised that Minnesota law requires him or her to 
take a chemical test to determine if he or she is under the influence of alcohol, 
that refusal to take the test is a crime, and that he or she has a right to consult an 
attorney before taking the test, as long as there would not be any unnecessary 
delay in the administration of the test). 
 79.  Bernard, 859 N.W.2d at 764–65. 
 80.  Id. at 765. 
 81.  Bernard, 859 N.W.2d at 765 n.1; see also MINN. STAT. §§ 169A.20, subdiv. 2, 
169A.24, subdiv. 1 (criminalizing the refusal to submit to a chemical test for 
intoxication and making it a felony-level offense if the defendant has had three or 
more impaired driving incidents within ten years). Because Bernard had four DWI 
12
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grounds that the test-refusal statute violated his right to due process 
because the statute criminalizes refusing an unreasonable, 
warrantless search.82 The district court ruled that the test-refusal 
statute was not unconstitutional on its face, but it dismissed the 
charges, concluding the police needed a warrant to search 
Bernard.83 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed this decision, 
holding that the test refusal statute did not violate Bernard’s right 
to due process because the officers could have secured a warrant to 
search Bernard’s breath.84 The Minnesota Court of Appeals 
reasoned that, because “the officer could have just as lawfully asked 
an independent jurist to issue a search warrant to test Bernard’s 
blood,” he was justified in asking Bernard to take the test.85 In 
dictum, the court of appeals also addressed the state’s argument 
that the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant 
requirement applies in this case to justify the post-arrest search of 
Bernard’s breath.86 It stated that the exception would not apply in 
this case because an exigent circumstance would also need to exist 
in order to satisfy that exception.87 The Minnesota Supreme Court 
granted review. 
B. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision 
Before the Minnesota Supreme Court, Bernard argued that 
the test refusal statute, as applied to him, violated his right to 
substantive due process because it criminalized his Fourth 
Amendment right to be free from unconstitutional, warrantless 
searches.88 The Minnesota Supreme Court first turned to the 
question of whether a warrantless search of Bernard’s breath was 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.89 After ruling that such 
a search was reasonable under the search-incident-to-arrest 
exception to the warrant requirement, the court asked the follow-
 
convictions since 2006, this offense qualified as a felony first-degree driving while 
impaired offense. See id. § 169A.24, subdiv. 1. 
 82.  Bernard, 859 N.W.2d at 765.  
 83.  Id. 
 84.  State v. Bernard, 844 N.W.2d 41, 45 (Minn. Ct. App. 2014). 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. at 47 (dictum). 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Bernard, 859 N.W.2d at 765. 
 89.  Id. at 766. 
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up question of whether such a search violated his right to 
substantive due process.90 The court ruled that it did not.91 
The Minnesota Supreme Court noted that a “warrantless 
search is generally unreasonable, unless it falls into one of the 
recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.”92 The court 
then stated that a search incident to a lawful arrest is one exception 
to the warrant requirement.93 The court explained that this 
exception allows police “to conduct a ‘full search of the person’ 
who has been lawfully arrested.”94 The majority held in this case 
that a warrantless search of Bernard’s breath was a search incident 
to a lawful arrest and, therefore, did not violate his Fourth 
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches.95 
The Minnesota Supreme Court justified its holding by 
separating searches incident to arrest into two categories: (1) 
police may search the person of the arrestee including pockets and 
clothing, and (2) police may search “the area within the immediate 
control of the arrestee.”96 The majority relied heavily on United 
States v. Robinson to support its position.97 The court stated, 
“Subsequent cases have addressed and limited the second type of 
search under the search-incident-to-arrest exception . . . but they 
have not narrowed the exception with respect to a search of the 
arrestee’s body.”98 The court supported this assertion by 
contending that previous cases have held “a full search of the person is 
not only an exception to the warrant requirement . . . but is also a 
‘reasonable’ search under that Amendment.”99 The majority went 
on to say that their interpretation of Robinson was that a warrantless 
search of a person’s body incident to arrest is “categorically 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment as a search incident to 
that person’s valid arrest.”100 The Minnesota Supreme Court 
recognized the applicability of the “categorical rule” here that was 
 
 90.  Id. at 773. 
 91.  Id. at 773–74. 
 92.  Id. at 766 (citing State v. Flowers, 734 N.W.2d 239, 248 (Minn. 2007)). 
 93.  Id. (citing Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009)). 
 94.  Id. (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973)). 
 95.  Id. at 767. 
 96.  Id. at 768–69 (quoting Robinson, 414 U.S. at 224). 
 97.  See id. at 769–71; see Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235. 
 98.  See Bernard, 859 N.W.2d at 769 (citing Arizona v. Gant, 566 U.S. 332, 351 
(2009)). 
 99.  Id. (quoting Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235). 
 100.  Id. (citing Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1559 (2013)). 
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addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Riley v. California 
where “a search of the person of an arrestee [is] justified only by 
the custodial arrest itself . . . .”101 
The court continued its reasoning by addressing Riley and 
United States v. Chadwick to further distinguish a search of a person’s 
body post-arrest from a search of the area within the person’s immediate 
control.102 Both Riley and Chadwick placed limitations on the search-
incident-to-arrest exception, but as the majority interpreted these 
cases, it only limits searches of the area within the arrestee’s 
control—it does not limit a search of one’s body.103 
Riley held, as the majority also pointed out, that a warrant is 
required to search the contents of a cell phone on a person post-
arrest and that a warrantless search was not justified by the search-
incident-to-arrest exception.104 Chadwick also limited “the type of 
property that may be categorically searched as part of a search 
incident to arrest to property immediately associated with the 
arrestee.”105 The court went on to say that because both Riley and 
Chadwick involved searches of property within the immediate 
control of the arrestee, any restrictions those holdings may have 
placed on searches incident to arrest applied only to searches of 
the area within the arrestee’s immediate control, and did not apply 
to searches of the arrestee’s body.106 
The majority supported its reasoning by comparing the search 
of Bernard’s breath to other searches incident to arrest that courts 
have held as valid.107 The court also supported its holding by citing 
several other cases upholding the reasonableness of breathalyzer 
tests as searches incident to arrest.108 The court concluded its 
 
 101.  Id. at 770 (quoting Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014)). 
 102.  Bernard, 859 N.W.2d at 770 (citing Riley, 134 S. Ct. 2473; United States v. 
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977)). 
 103.  Id. at 771. 
 104.  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494–95; see also Bernard, 859 N.W.2d at 770. 
 105.  Bernard, 859 N.W.2d at 771 (interpreting Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484). 
 106.  Id. at 771 (interpreting Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484, and Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 
15). 
 107.  Id. at 767 (citing State v. Riley, 303 Minn. 251, 255, 226 N.W.2d 907, 910 
(1975)) (holding a warrantless inspection of an arrested man’s penis as a valid 
search incident to a lawful arrest). The court also cites State v. Bonner, where the 
court upheld the taking of an arrestee’s fingerprints and photographs, to illustrate 
its comparison with Bernard. 146 N.W.2d 770, 775 (Minn. 1996). 
 108.  Bernard, 859 N.W.2d at 767 (citing United States v. Reid, 929 F.2d 990, 
994 (4th Cir. 1991)) (holding reasonable searches incident to a lawful arrest to 
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analysis of the first issue by noting its inability to locate “a single 
case” in the United States holding warrantless breath tests 
impermissible under the exception.109 
Holding that a warrantless search of Bernard’s breath was not 
unreasonable, and therefore did not violate his Fourth 
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches, the court 
turned to the issue of whether such a search violated Bernard’s 
right to substantive due process.110 The court began its due process 
analysis by asking whether or not the challenged statute implicates 
a fundamental right.111 The court reasoned that, because the search 
of Bernard’s breath was constitutional under the Fourth 
Amendment, no fundamental right was implicated by the test 
refusal statute.112 Because the statute did not implicate a 
fundamental right, the court analyzed the test refusal statute under 
the rational basis standard.113 Finding that Minnesota has a 
legitimate interest in highway safety, and that criminalizing drivers 
suspected of driving while impaired for refusing to submit a breath 
test was a reasonable means to further that interest, the court held 
that the test refusal statute did not violate Bernard’s right to 
substantive due process.114 Based on this analysis, the majority 
affirmed the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ decision and Bernard’s 
conviction.115 
 
include breathalyzer tests).  
 109.  Id. at 767–68. But consider Williams v. State, decided after Bernard, where 
the Florida District Court of Appeals held that neither officer safety, nor 
preservation of evidence, would justify a breath test as permissible under the 
search-incident-to-arrest exception. Williams v. State, 167 So. 3d 483, 492 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (dictum), cert. granted, No. SC15-1417, 2015 WL 9594290 (Fla. 
Dec. 30, 2015). Although the majority is technically correct in its assertions, 
Williams draws into serious question the majority’s assumption that courts truly are 
all in agreement on this issue. 
 110.  Bernard, 859 N.W.2d at 773. 
 111.  Id.  
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id.; see also supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text. 
 114.  Bernard, 859 N.W.2d at 773–74. 
 115.  Id. at 774. 
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C. The Dissenting Opinion 
Justice Page and Justice Stras filed a joint dissenting opinion.116 
The dissent began by arguing that the majority erred in two 
respects: 
First, the court assumes, without support, that biological 
material may be taken from inside a person’s body as part 
of a search incident to arrest. Second, the court assumes, 
again without support, that the rationales underlying the 
search-incident-to-arrest exception—officer safety and 
preventing the destruction of evidence—do not apply to 
searches of a person.117 
The dissenters argued that “the Supreme Court has never 
implied, much less stated, that the search-incident-to-arrest 
exception extends to the forcible removal of substances from 
within a person’s body.”118 They supported their argument by 
pointing out the facts surrounding the search in Robinson, stating, 
“The ‘full search of the person’ involved only a pat down and an 
examination of the contents of Robinson’s pockets, not an invasive 
search to retrieve biological material from within his body.”119 The 
dissent argued that if the search had been more invasive factually, a 
full search may not have been justified.120 
The dissent continued by criticizing the majority’s broad 
interpretation of Robinson, quoting Riley for support. The dissenters 
argued that “when [the Supreme Court] refers to a search of a 
person incident to arrest, as in Robinson, it is talking about personal 
property—that is, evidence—found on a person.”121 They pointed to 
the Supreme Court in Robinson, and cautioned on the proper scope 
of the exception, stating that “while Robinson’s categorical rule 
strikes the appropriate balance in the context of physical objects, 
neither of its rationales has much force with respect to digital 
contents on cell phones.”122 The dissenting justices believed Riley 
clarified that Robinson’s holding applies only to physical evidence 
 
 116.  Id. (Page and Stras, JJ., dissenting). 
 117.  Id. (citation omitted). 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. at 775. 
 120.  Id. (Page and Stras, JJ., dissenting) (“[T]he interests supporting a search 
incident to arrest would hardly justify disrobing an arrestee on the street . . . .” 
(quoting Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 645 (1983))). 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Id. (quoting Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014)). 
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rather than digital content; in turn they stated that “the only logical 
conclusion is that removal of breath (or blood or urine) from the 
body to discover an arrestee’s blood alcohol level is not part of a 
search incident to arrest.”123 
The dissent’s second point of contention with the majority 
opinion was the majority’s assumption that “the rationales for the 
search-incident-to-arrest exception—officer safety and preventing 
the destruction of evidence—d[id] not apply to searches of a 
person.”124 The dissent believed this “assumption [wa]s in conflict 
with Supreme Court precedent.”125 
The dissent argued that the majority unjustifiably separated 
searches incident-to-arrest into two categories: searches of the 
person and searches of the area within his or her immediate 
control.126 It then argued that the majority further erred when it 
applied the justifications of officer safety and preservation of 
evidence only to the latter category of searches, allowing a full 
search of the arrestee justified by the arrest itself.127 The dissent 
found this separation unjustified by precedent, arguing that 
Robinson and Riley did not reject the Chimel rationales of officer 
safety and preservation of evidence as justifications for the search-
incident-to-arrest exception, and did not extend the scope of the 
search-incident-to-arrest exception beyond the purposes it 
intended to serve.128 
The dissent recognized the majority’s need to separate these 
searches into two different categories; if the majority did not, the 
Chimel rationales would not justify a search of Bernard’s breath: 
The only justification for allowing police to conduct a 
warrantless breath test is the preservation of evidence due 
to the natural dissipation of alcohol from a person’s 
bloodstream. In McNeely, however, the Supreme Court 
specifically rejected the proposition that the natural 
metabolization of alcohol constitutes a per se exigency 
justifying a warrantless blood test.129 
 
 123.  Id. at 776. 
 124.  Id. at 777. 
 125.  Id.  
 126.  Id. at 777–78. 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Id. at 778. 
 129.  Id.  
18
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The dissent believed the majority’s separation of a search of 
one’s body from a search of the area within his or her immediate 
control and recognition of a categorical “bright-line” rule was 
simply an attempt to “readopt[] a per se exigency under a different 
name.”130 
The dissent then moved to the topic of whether the test refusal 
statute was constitutional. The dissent concluded “that, in 
Bernard’s case, it [wa]s not.”131 The dissent noted that “a state 
cannot criminalize the refusal to consent to an illegal warrantless 
search.”132 They end their constitutional analysis by arguing that the 
state cannot criminalize Bernard’s right to refuse unconstitutional 
searches; because of this, the test refusal statute violated Bernard’s 
right to due process.133 
Although the dissent concluded that the test refusal statute was 
unconstitutional as applied to Bernard, it also acknowledged that 
there might be a situation where it would be constitutional to 
criminalize a test refusal, such as when it would be extremely 
difficult or impossible for law enforcement to get a search 
warrant.134 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. Unjustifiable Separation of Searches Incident to Arrest 
Separating the search of a person’s body and a search of the area 
within his or her immediate control incident to a lawful arrest is not 
supported by Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The United States 
Supreme Court in Chimel made no attempt to separate searches of 
an arrestee’s person from the area within his or her immediate 
control. In fact, the Supreme Court in Chimel seemed to think that 
 
 130.  Id. at 779. 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Id. (citing Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 540 (1967)). 
 133.  Id. at 780. 
 134.  Id. at 779–80 (citing Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1561 (2013)). 
The United States Supreme Court in McNeely also acknowledged this possibility, 
noting that even though a warrantless blood test did not constitute a per se 
exigency, there might be situations where, because of the difficulty to obtain a 
warrant, an exigency could exist, justifying a warrantless blood test. McNeely, 133 S. 
Ct. at 1568. Such circumstances would, however, “vary depending upon the 
circumstances in the case.” Id. 
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the underlying rationales applied to both types of searches.135 The 
Court’s rationale in Chimel behind the search-incident-to-arrest 
exception applies to both types of searches, as is evidenced by the 
use of the disjunctive word “or” in the phrase “[assaulting an officer 
and destroying weapons] might easily happen where the weapon or 
evidence is on the accused’s person or under his immediate 
control.”136 
The Supreme Court in Arizona v. Gant also made no 
distinction between a search of a person’s body and a search of the 
area within his or her immediate control. Again, the language the 
Court used seemed to reiterate that the rationales behind the 
search-incident-to-arrest exception apply to both types of 
searches.137 Quoting Chimel, the Supreme Court in Gant 
acknowledged the Supreme Court’s justification for searches 
incident to arrest, noting that “searches incident to arrest are 
reasonable ‘in order to remove any weapons [the arrestee] might 
seek to use’ and ‘in order to prevent [the] concealment or 
destruction’ of evidence . . . .”138 Like Chimel, the language in Gant 
suggests the rationales underlying searches of an arrestee’s body 
are the same rationales underlying searches of the area within his 
or her immediate control. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court argued that both Robinson and 
Riley justify making such a distinction.139 However, a closer reading 
of Riley suggests it actually narrowed the scope of the search of a 
 
 135.  Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 764 (1969) (“The rule allowing 
contemporaneous searches is justified, for example, by the need to seize weapons 
and other things which might be used to assault an officer or effect an escape, as 
well as by the need to prevent the destruction of evidence of the crime—things 
which might easily happen where the weapon or evidence is on the accused’s 
person or under his immediate control. But these justifications are absent where a 
search is remote in time or place from the arrest.” (quoting Preston v. United 
States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964))). 
 136.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 137.  Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 339 (2009) (“In Chimel, we held that a 
search incident to arrest may only include “the arrestee’s person and the area 
‘within his immediate control’, . . . . That limitation, which continues to define the 
boundaries of the exception, ensures that the scope of a search incident to arrest 
is commensurate with its purposes of protecting arresting officers and 
safeguarding any evidence of the offense of arrest that an arrestee might conceal 
or destroy.” (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763)).  
 138.  Id. (alteration in original). 
 139.  Bernard, 859 N.W.2d at 770. 
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person.140 As the dissent in Bernard points out, Riley clarified that 
“while Robinson’s categorical rule strikes the appropriate balance in 
the context of physical objects, neither of its rationales has much 
force with respect to digital content on cell phones.”141 Observing a 
categorical rule in the context of physical objects found on a person is 
completely consistent with the Chimel rationales of officer safety 
and evidence preservation. Physical objects can be both a weapon 
and destroyable evidence. It makes sense why the Supreme Court 
would justify a search of a cigarette package found on a person as a 
search incident to a lawful arrest based on officer safety and 
evidence preservation.142 
But Riley refused to extend the Robinson holding to the 
contents of cell phones because “[t]here are no comparable risks 
[to officer safety or evidence destruction] when the search is of 
digital data.”143 Further, nowhere in Robinson or Riley does the 
Supreme Court say the Chimel rationales only apply to searches of 
the area within the immediate control of the arrestee.144 The 
Minnesota Supreme Court is correct in its assertion that the 
particular cases it cited, Chadwick145 and Riley,146 limited the type of 
property that can be searched incident to arrest, but that is not to 
 
 140.  Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490–91 (2014) (“In 1926, Learned 
Hand observed . . . that it is ‘a totally different thing to search a man’s pockets and 
use against him what they contain, from ransacking his house for everything which 
may incriminate him.’ If his pockets contain a cell phone, however, that is no 
longer true.”) (citation omitted). 
 141.  Bernard, 859 N.W.2d at 775 (Page and Stras, JJ., dissenting) (emphasis 
added) (quoting Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484). 
 142.  United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973) (“Having in the 
course of a lawful search come upon the crumpled package of cigarettes, he was 
entitled to inspect it; and when his inspection revealed the heroin capsules, he was 
entitled to seize them as ‘fruits, instrumentalities, or contraband’ probative of 
criminal conduct.”). 
 143.  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485. 
 144.  Bernard, 859 N.W.2d at 778 (Page and Stras, JJ., dissenting) (“[N]either 
Robinson nor Riley rejected the Chimel rationales as bookends for the circumstances 
under which the search-incident-to-arrest exception applies.”). While Robinson 
does state that “[e]xamination of this Court’s decisions shows that these two 
propositions have been treated quite differently,” it goes on to say that the two 
types of searches are “likewise conceded in principle.” 414 U.S. at 224 (emphasis 
added). The Robinson decision then quotes Chimel and its underlying rationales of 
officer safety and evidence preservation. Id. at 225–26.  
 145.  433 U.S. 1 (1977) (holding that a warrantless search of a footlocker was 
not justified as a search incident to arrest). 
 146.  134 S. Ct. 2473. 
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say that the underlying principles of Chimel do not apply to other 
types of searches incident to arrest. 
Finally, the Minnesota Supreme Court tried to justify its 
position by pointing to State v. Riley, which allowed a warrantless 
visual search of an arrested man’s penis under the search-incident-
to-arrest exception.147 However, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
failed to mention State v. Lussier, which came to the opposite 
conclusion.148 Lussier stated that the holding in State v. Riley did not 
apply to its situation because the search in Lussier went 
“significantly further than a visual inspection and involve[d] a 
greater privacy interest.”149 The court in Lussier concluded that the 
search was not justified by the arrest alone.150 
Furthermore, the Minnesota Court of Appeals in Lussier made 
no distinction between a search of person’s body and a search of 
the area immediately surrounding him or her; in fact, the language 
again seems to suggest the exact opposite: 
[N]either justification for the search-incident-to-arrest 
exception—officer safety and preservation of evidence—
was present here given that respondent was handcuffed 
and was under constant police observation. Accordingly, 
we conclude that because respondent was restrained and 
observed by officers at all times, the warrantless collection 
of evidence from his genitals was not justified by the need 
to preserve evidence.151 
Lussier, Chimel, and Gant all draw into serious question the 
Minnesota Supreme Court’s claim that a “categorical rule” exists 
allowing a full search of the person of an arrestee.152 These cases 
are not the only ones to do so.153 It is for these reasons the 
 
 147.  See Bernard, 859 N.W.2d at 767; see also State v. Riley, 303 Minn. 251, 254, 
226 N.W.2d 907, 909 (1975). 
 148.  770 N.W.2d 581, 589 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that a warrantless 
SARS examination of the defendant’s genitals was not valid under the search-
incident-to-arrest exception), reh’g denied, (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2009). 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Id. (stating the search involved actual touching of the defendant’s 
genitals while the search in Riley involved only a visual inspection). 
 151.  Id. (citing Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 339 (2009)). 
 152.  Bernard, 859 N.W.2d at 770. 
 153.  See, e.g., Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973) (holding a warrantless 
search of defendant’s fingernails was justified where probable cause to arrest 
existed, noting “[t]he basis for this exception is that when an arrest is made, it is 
reasonable for a police officer to expect the arrestee to use any weapons he may 
have and to attempt to destroy any incriminating evidence then in his 
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Minnesota Supreme Court should have analyzed the warrantless 
search of Bernard’s breath under the rationales set forth in Chimel. 
B.  Under Proper Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, a Breath Test Is Not 
Justified as a Search Incident to Arrest 
As the dissent points out, the majority must separate searches 
of one’s body and searches of the area within his or her immediate 
control in order to reach its result.154 Application of the Chimel 
rationale behind searches incident to arrest—officer safety, and 
evidence preservation155—reveals that a warrantless search of one’s 
breath is not justified by the search-incident-to-arrest exception.156 
To begin with, a breath test is clearly not being used for officer 
safety. Therefore, the only rationale that could justify a breath test 
as a search incident to arrest is evidence preservation. Searches for 
evidence preservation are justified to prevent the active 
concealment or destruction of evidence, that is, to prevent the 
defendant from concealing or destroying evidence.157 A defendant 
cannot actively destroy the concentration of alcohol in his body. As 
discussed above, the natural dissipation of alcohol alone does not 
justify a search of one’s body under the Fourth Amendment.158 
McNeely made it clear that there was no per se exigency from the 
 
possession”); State v. Robb, 605 N.W.2d 96, 100 (Minn. 2000) (“One exemption 
from the warrant requirement is that a person’s body and the area within his or 
her immediate control may be searched incident to a lawful arrest . . . . This 
exemption ensures officer safety by allowing officers to remove any weapons the 
arrestee might reach and also prevents the arrestee from tampering with or 
destroying evidence or contraband.”) (citation omitted). 
 154.  Bernard, 859 N.W.2d at 778 (Page and Stras, JJ., dissenting). 
 155.  See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969). 
 156.  Gant, 566 U.S. at 339 (stating if it is impossible for an arrestee to gain 
access to the area officers are trying to search, then the exception does not exist). 
 157.  See id. (“That limitation, which continues to define the boundaries of the 
exception, ensures that the scope of a search incident to arrest is commensurate 
with its purposes of protecting arresting officers and safeguarding any evidence of 
the offense of arrest that an arrestee might conceal or destroy.”) (emphasis added); 
Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763 (“[I]t is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to 
search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its 
concealment or destruction. . . . [This includes] the area ‘within his immediate 
control’—construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain 
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.”) (emphasis added). 
 158.  Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1558 (2013) (“[T]he natural 
dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute an exigency in every 
case sufficient to justify conducting a blood test without a warrant.”). 
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natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood stream.159 Because a 
defendant cannot actively destroy the alcohol in his bloodstream, 
and because the Supreme Court has already rejected the natural 
dissipation of alcohol as a per se exigent circumstance authorizing 
a warrantless search, the evidence preservation rationale in Chimel 
does not justify a warrantless breath test as a search incident to 
arrest.160 Therefore, the search-incident-to-arrest exception should 
not have been applied in this case. 
C.  Despite the Bernard Holding, Your Body Is Still Your Temple 
It is undisputed that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, 
not places.”161 “The overriding function of the Fourth Amendment 
is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted 
intrusion by the State.”162 Bodily integrity is at the heart of Fourth 
Amendment privacy concerns.163 Because of this, we should not 
accept the Minnesota Supreme Court’s assertion that a warrantless 
intrusion into a body cavity is ever justified.164 
As stated, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under 
the Fourth Amendment.165 Because personal privacy and bodily 
integrity are at the heart of the Fourth Amendment, courts must 
 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  See Gant, 556 U.S. at 339 (citing Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763) (“If there is no 
possibility that an arrestee could reach into the area that law enforcement officers 
seek to search, both justifications for the search-incident-to-arrest exception are 
absent and the rule does not apply.”). 
 161.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); see United States v. 
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977) (“[M]ore particularly, it protects people from 
unreasonable government intrusions into their legitimate expectations of 
privacy.”); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (noting that the Fourth 
Amendment’s exclusionary doctrine was “an essential part of the right to privacy”). 
 162.  Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966). 
 163.  See id. at 772 (“The integrity of an individual’s person is a cherished value 
of our society.”); see also McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1558 (“[A] compelled physical 
intrusion beneath [the defendant’s] skin and into his veins [constitutes] an 
invasion of bodily integrity [that] implicates an individual’s ‘most personal and 
deep-rooted expectations of privacy.’” (quoting Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 
(1985))).  
 164.  Cf. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1989 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“I doubt that the proud men who wrote the charter of our liberties would have 
been so eager to open their mouths for royal inspection.”). 
 165.  See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (“[S]earches conducted outside the judicial 
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment.”). 
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balance the degree that an exception to the warrant requirement 
impedes on an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy 
against the degree that an exception promotes legitimate 
governmental interests.166 The Supreme Court has invalidated many 
searches that cross the line from promoting governmental interests 
into the realm of intruding upon individual autonomy and 
privacy.167 
Of course, the government has a compelling interest in 
protecting people from drunk drivers.168 However, creating an 
exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement is not 
“needed for the promotion”169 of this interest. If the Minnesota 
Supreme Court is worried about people refusing to take chemical 
tests to determine if they are intoxicated—which would allow the 
evidence in their breath, blood, and urine to slowly dissipate while 
a warrant is secured—a much simpler remedy is available. 
Instead of criminalizing test refusal under the guise of 
expedited testing, the Minnesota legislature could lower the 
statutory intoxication limit or extend the time frame that law 
enforcement officials have to secure a test.170 Once a warrant is 
secured, then the search is reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment, provided officers abide by the warrant.171 If the 
legislature were to criminalize a warranted search as a test refusal, it 
 
 166.  Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014) (quoting Wyoming v. 
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)). 
 167.  See, e.g., id. at 2485 (arguing that, because cell phones “place vast 
quantities of personal information literally in the hands of individuals,” the privacy 
interests associated with warrantless searches of cell phones outweigh the 
comparable risk of losing evidence); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 
(1969). 
 168.  In 2012, 114 people were killed by drunk drivers in Minnesota alone; this 
constituted 29% of all traffic related deaths. 2012 Drunk Driving Fatalities by State, 
MADD BLOG (Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.madd.org/blog/2013/november/2012 
-drunk-driving-fatalities.html. 
 169.  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484 (quoting Houghton, 526 U.S. at 300). 
 170.  A person is statutorily intoxicated for the purposes of the driving-while-
impaired statute if “the person’s alcohol concentration at the time, or as measured 
within two hours of the time, of driving, operating, or being in physical control of 
the motor vehicle is 0.08 or more.” MINN. STAT. § 169A.20, subdiv. 1(5) (2014). 
 171.  See 68 AM. JUR. 2D Searches and Seizures § 306 (2015) (“When law 
enforcement officers execute a valid search warrant and act in a reasonable 
manner to protect themselves from harm, the Fourth Amendment is not 
violated.”). 
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would be free to do so, because the Fourth Amendment does not 
protect against reasonable searches and seizures.172 
To minimize a person’s right to personal privacy, individual 
autonomy, and bodily integrity is one thing, but to argue that 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence sanctions it is quite another. As 
“every man’s house is his castle,”173 so too is his body his temple. It 
seems contradictory to hold that people have a greater privacy 
interest in the contents of their cell phones and in their homes 
than they do inside their body cavities—their bladder or inside 
their veins. As the dissent in Bernard points out, if the digital 
contents of a cell phone are safe from a search incident to arrest, 
“the only logical conclusion is that the removal of breath (or blood 
or urine) from the body to discover an arrestee’s blood alcohol 
level is not part of a search incident to arrest.”174 Just as the 
Supreme Court in Riley refused to extend the holding in Robinson 
to the search of data on a cell phone, and the Court in Chimel and 
Mincey refused to allow the search of one’s home incident to arrest, 
the Minnesota Supreme Court should not have justified a 
warrantless search of Bernard’s breath.175 
D. Due Process 
As mentioned above, due process provides “heightened 
protection against government interference with certain 
fundamental rights and liberty interests.”176 Fundamental rights are 
those rights and liberties that are “‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s 
history and tradition’ . . . and ‘implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if they 
were sacrificed.’”177 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
 
 172.  See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 173.  Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914). 
 174.  State v. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d 762, 776 (Minn. 2015) (Page and Stras, JJ., 
dissenting). 
 175.  Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014); see also Bernard, 859 
N.W.2d at 777 (Page and Stras, JJ., dissenting) (“[A] person taking a breath test 
must insert a tube into his or her mouth and then comply with the officer’s 
instructions [on how] to blow into the tube at a specified rate . . . . The court does 
not cite a single Supreme Court case authorizing such a profound intrusion into a 
person’s bodily integrity during a search incident to arrest.”). 
 176.  Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997); see supra Part II.D. 
 177.  Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 
431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325–26 (1937)). 
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Amendment imposes a duty on the Supreme Court to review laws 
of the states to determine whether laws violate our fundamental 
rights and liberty interests.178 
The Supreme Court considers state action unconstitutional 
under the Due Process Clause if the conduct “shocks the 
conscience.”179 For example, in Rochin v. California, the Supreme 
Court reversed a conviction based on conduct that did just that—
conduct that is not too far off from Bernard’s situation.180 When 
officers entered the open Rochin residence and forced their way 
into his bedroom on a tip that he was selling narcotics, they found 
him sitting on his bed partly dressed with his common-law wife.181 
Upon seeing the officers, Rochin grabbed two capsules off his 
nightstand and shoved them in his mouth.182 Rochin was 
handcuffed and taken to a hospital where officers ordered doctors 
to force “an emetic solution through a tube into Rochin’s stomach 
against his will.”183 After doctors pumped Rochin’s stomach against 
his will, he vomited up the capsules, which were used against him at 
trial and resulted in his conviction.184 The Supreme Court reversed 
his conviction, finding that the officer’s conduct shocked the 
conscious and violated Rochin’s right to due process of law.185 
By criminalizing Bernard’s right to refuse an unreasonable 
search, the Minnesota legislature has effectively allowed officers to 
pry open a defendant’s mouth and shove a tube inside of it in 
order to gain evidence to use against them at trial without a 
warrant. You can refuse, but you will be charged with a new 
crime.186 This is no choice in any sense of the word—the option to 
 
 178.  Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) (noting that the Supreme 
Court reviews laws “in order to ascertain whether they offend those canons of 
decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking 
peoples even toward those charged with the most heinous offenses.” (quoting 
Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 416–17 (1945))). 
 179.  Id. at 172. 
 180.  Id. at 174. 
 181.  Id. at 166.  
 182.  Id.  
 183.  Id. 
 184.  Id.  
 185.  Id. at 172 (“Illegally breaking into the privacy of the petitioner, the 
struggle to open his mouth and remove what was there, the forcible extraction of 
his stomach’s contents—this course of proceeding by agents of government to 
obtain evidence is bound to offend even hardened sensibilities. They are methods 
too close to the rack and the screw to permit of constitutional differentiation.”). 
 186.  See MINN. STAT. § 169A.51, subdiv. 2 (2014). 
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refuse a drug test presents only the appearance of a choice; 
however, the individual will be charged regardless. The Minnesota 
test refusal statute violates one of our most deeply rooted 
fundamental liberties: the right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment.187 
If a statute violates a fundamental right under the Fourteenth 
Amendment due process clause, its constitutionality is subject to 
strict scrutiny.188 Having argued that a breath test is not justified 
under the search-incident-to-arrest exception, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court should have analyzed the mandatory breath test 
statute under a strict scrutiny standard.189 While the state has a 
compelling interest in highway safety, the test-refusal statute is not 
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. There is a much less 
restrictive means to achieve this interest: either lower the statutory 
intoxication level or extend the time allowed to secure a warrant.190 
After that, go get a warrant. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Minnesota Supreme Court ruled in Bernard that a statute 
criminalizing the refusal to take a breath test did not violate 
Bernard’s right to due process because a warrantless breath test was 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment as a search incident to a 
lawful arrest.191 Review of the relevant case law has demonstrated 
that the court misinterpreted the search-incident-to-arrest 
exception and failed to consider important public policy 
considerations required by the Fourth Amendment. Holding a 
warrant is required to search the contents of a cell phone and to 
search one’s dwelling after a lawful arrest, but finding a warrant is 
 
 187.  Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1558 (2013); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (noting that the Fourth Amendment protects people’s 
“freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence”); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 
U.S. 25, 27–28 (1949) (“The security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by 
the police—which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment—is basic to a free 
society. It is therefore implicit in ‘the concept of ordered liberty’ and as such 
enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause.”).  
 188.  See supra notes 63–66 and accompanying text. 
 189.  See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (“[S]earches 
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or 
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 190.  See MINN. STAT. § 169.20 (2014). 
 191.  State v. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d 762, 773–74 (Minn. 2015). 
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not required to stick a tube in one’s mouth after a lawful arrest is 




 192.  On June 15, 2015, Bernard petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. 
Supreme Court. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Bernard v. Minnesota, No. 14-
1470 (U.S. June 15, 2015). The U.S. Supreme Court granted the petition on 
December 11, 2015. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d 762, cert. granted sub nom., Bernard v. 
Minnesota, 136 S. Ct. 615 (2015); David Chanen, U.S. Supreme Court to Review 
Constitutionality of Minnesota’s DWI Test-Refusal Law, STAR TRIB. (MINNEAPOLIS) (Dec. 
12, 2015, 7:49 AM), http://www.startribune.com/u-s              -supreme-court-to-
review-constitutionality-of-minnesota-s-dwi-test-refusal-law /361634621. The U.S. 
Supreme Court did not state explicitly why it took the case. Id. However, it usually 
takes cases for a specific reason: the case may have an impact on the entire 
country, there may be a split among the federal circuits, or a case may alter 
current precedent. Supreme Court Procedures, U.S. COURTS (Dec. 17, 2015, 8:24 PM), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/educational-resources/about-
educational-outreach/activity-resources/supreme-1. This case will no doubt have 
national impact, as forty-seven states currently have similar implied-consent laws. 
Chanen, supra note 192. Minnesota’s implied consent law is somewhat unique in 
that it is only one of twelve to actually criminalize refusing to take a chemical test 
following a DWI arrest. Id. It is estimated that the Court’s holding will affect 
approximately 20,000 chemical tests in Minnesota each year, not to mention the 
effect it will have on other cases around the country. Id. Although not always, it is 
believed that the Court will generally hear a case in order to reverse it. Stephen 
Wermiel, SCOTUS for Law Students: Scoring the Circuits, SCOTUSBLOG (June 22, 
2014, 10:28 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06 /scotus-for-law-students-
sponsored-by-bloomberg-law-scoring-the-circuits (noting that between 2011 and 
2014, the Court reversed approximately 70.5% of the cases it reviewed). The Court 
will review Bernard, along with a North Dakota case, to determine the 
constitutionality of the implied-consent laws. Dan Koewler, Chuck Ramsay 
Interviewed by Minnesota Lawyer Regarding the Bernard Case, MINN. DWI DEFENSE 
(December 18, 2015), http://www.mndwidefenseblog.com/articles /fourth-
amendment. Minnesota criminal defense lawyers are hopeful, and “don’t think it’s 
likely that the U.S. Supreme Court just wants to pat Minnesota and North Dakota 
on the back and say, ‘Hey, you’re doing a great job of upholding the United States 
Constitution!’” Id. Hopefully the U.S. Supreme Court will acknowledge that the 
U.S. Constitution applies all of the time, whether its two o’clock in the afternoon, 
or two o’clock in the morning. 
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